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ABSTRACT 
 
Do voters reward national leaders who are more competent economic managers, or 
merely those who happen to be in power when the world economy booms? According to 
rational voting models, electors should parse out the state of the world economy when 
deciding whether to re-elect their national leader. I test this theory using data from 268 
democratic elections held between 1978 and 1999, comparing the effect of world growth 
(“luck”) and national growth relative to world growth (“competence”). In the preferred 
specification, which allows for countries to have different degrees of global integration, 
an extra percentage point of world growth boosts incumbents’ chances of re-election by 9 
percent, while an extra percentage point of national growth relative to world growth only 
boosts an incumbent’s chances of re-election by 4 percent. Voters are more likely to 
reward competence in countries that are richer and better educated. Controlling for 
income, higher rates of newspaper readership reduce the returns to luck, while higher 
rates of television viewing reduce the returns to competence. 
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1. Introduction 
Are national leaders more likely to be re-elected when the world economy 
booms? This paper provides new evidence on whether voters behave according to a 
purely rational model by considering the impact of an exogenous factor – the state of the 
world economy – on the outcomes of 268 democratic national elections over the past 
three decades.  
That the economy affects elections has been amply demonstrated, including in the 
US House of Representatives (Stigler 1973; Jacobson & Kernell 1983; Lewis-Beck & 
Rice 1984), the US Presidential race (Hibbs 1982; Markus 1988; Fair 2002), Canada 
(Nadeau & Blais 1993), Australia (Jackman and Marks 1994; Cameron and Crosby 2000; 
Wolfers and Leigh 2002), as well as across OECD countries (Alesina, Roubini and 
Cohen 1999), Latin American nations (Remmer 1991), and certain developing countries 
(Schuknecht 1996; Pacek and Radcliff 1995). However, this literature has principally 
focused on political business cycles and election forecasting, rather than on separating the 
effect of the world economy from the effect of national economic performance. 
According to rational voting models, such as Alesina, Roubini and Cohen (1999), 
voters should make their decisions based purely on politicians’ competence, and not on 
factors outside their control.1 However, a literature since Downs (1957) argues that voters 
will be “rationally ignorant”, since there is virtually zero chance that their vote will 
influence the outcome (for empirical evidence on this point, see Mulligan and Hunter 
2001). In the context of US gubernatorial elections, Wolfers (2002) shows that a model of 
quasi-rationality may be more appropriate. Analyzing whether voters parse out the effect 
of the national economy, he finds that while voters make some attempt to evaluate their 
state’s economy relative to the national economy, those in pro-cyclical states are 
consistently fooled into re-electing incumbents in national booms, and dumping them in 
national recessions.2
 
                                                 
1 For example, Alesina, Roubini and Cohen state that: “Although important work in macro-political 
economics predates the rational expectations revolution in macroeconomics, a new literature emerged as a 
result of developments in the rational theory of economic policy. This literature emphasizes the constraints 
that the assumption of individual rationality imposes on the ability of policy-makers to systematically, 
predictably, and permanently influence the state of the economy along an inflation-unemployment trade-
off; and policymakers’ ability to systematically fool the electorate.” (1999, 253) 
2 Achen and Bartels (2004) also cast doubt on a purely rational model, showing that voter behavior is 
affected by factors entirely beyond the control of politicians, including droughts, floods and shark attacks. 
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Here, I shift the analysis up one level – exploring whether voters in national 
elections attempt to evaluate their country’s economic performance relative to the world 
economy. I find that voters in national elections are more likely to re-elect incumbents 
when the world economy booms. Indeed, world economic growth (“luck”) has a greater 
effect on incumbents’ re-election chances than the amount by which national economic 
growth exceeds world growth (“competence”). Voters are more likely to reward 
competence in countries that are richer or better educated.  Voters are less likely to 
reward luck in countries that have a higher newspaper circulation rate. By contrast, in 
countries with more televisions, voters are less likely to reward competence.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section I outlines the data 
sources and variables of interest. Section II looks at the effect of the world and national 
economy on national elections, and finds little evidence that the effect is driven by oil 
prices. Section III explores whether voters’ ability to parse out luck from competence 
differs systematically according to income, education or media penetration; and the final 
section concludes. 
 
2. Data  
Each of the specifications presented in this paper uses as the dependent variable 
whether the party of the country’s “chief executive” (generally, the President or Prime 
Minister) is re-elected. Elections that are marred by fraud are excluded, as are elections 
taking place in the world’s two largest economies – the United States (which accounts for 
32 percent of world GDP), and Japan (14 percent of world GDP). For these two nations, 
world growth is not necessarily exogenous (the next largest economy, Germany, has only 
6 percent of world GDP).  
Political data is taken from the World Bank’s Database of Political Institutions, 
which codes the party of the chief executive for the years 1975-2000. Because the key 
independent variable is growth since the last election, the first election for each country is 
excluded. In addition, because I code re-election based on the party of the chief executive 
in the year following the election, the last year of the sample is excluded. This leaves a 
sample of 58 countries and 268 elections, held between 1978 and 1999. The average term 
length is 3.4 years.  
The two dependent variables are constructed from the average annual growth in 
real world GDP per capita since the last election, and that country’s average annual 
growth in real GDP per capita (both from World Development Indicators 2004). Growth 
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in real GDP per capita is used in preference to inflation or unemployment for two 
reasons. First, growth fluctuates more over short periods than either of the other two 
variables. Secondly, growth is a clearly measurable summary “of the average state of 
material well-being or prosperity in the electorate” (Goodman & Kramer 1975, 1260).  
Data on oil prices is from IMF price indicators, adjusted for inflation with the US 
CPI-U. Education is the average number of years of education of the population aged 15 
and over, from Barro and Lee (2000). Three measures of media penetration are used: the 
number of newspapers, the number of radios and the number of televisions per person, all 
from World Development Indicators 2004 (based on data originally collected by 
UNESCO). For each country, education and media penetration figures are averaged 
across the period 1975-2000. 
 
Table 1 presents summary statistics. 
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics    
Variable N Mean SD 
Whether party of national 
leader is re-elected 268 0.570 0.495 
Growth in national real GDP 
per capita (%) 268 1.411 3.555 
Growth in world real GDP per 
capita (%) 268 1.132 0.960 
Log national real GDP per 
capita 268 8.365 1.520 
Mean years of education of 
the population aged 15 or over 232 6.491 2.719 
Daily newspaper circulation 
per person 258 0.163 0.149 
Radios per person 268 0.510 0.319 
Televisions per person 268 0.249 0.179 
 
3. Separating Luck and Competence 
At the outset, it is worth determining the extent to which national growth over the 
previous term (whether caused by world growth or not) affects election outcomes. Table 
2 shows the results from the following fixed effects probit regression for country c in 
election term t: 
 
(1) Re-elect(0,1) c,t = βGrowth National c,t + ζICountryc + ε c,t 
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and its random effects counterpart: 
 
(2) Re-elect(0,1) c,t = α + βGrowth National c,t + uc + εc,t 
 
where uc is a group-specific random element. 
 
To determine whether a fixed or random-effects model should be used, a 
Hausman test is used to compare the results from these two regressions. The test statistic 
is 5.46, which is above the critical value of χ2(1) at the 5% level, suggesting that we 
should reject the hypothesis that country effects are uncorrelated with the other regressor. 
On this basis, only fixed effects models are presented for the remainder of the paper. 
 
 
Table 2: Does growth help national leaders get re-elected? 
Dependent variable: Whether the party of the national leader is re-elected 
 (1) Fixed Effects (2) Random 
Effects 
National GDP growth (percentage 
points) 
0.0463*** 
(0.0143) 
0.0605** 
(0.0273) 
Observed Prob. 0.570 - 
Predicted Prob. 0.586 - 
Pseudo R2 0.16 - 
Elections 268 268 
Countries 58 58 
Hausman Test χ2(1)= 5.46 (Prob > χ2 = 0.0195) 
Notes: Coefficients are marginal probabilities from a probit model, with standard errors in parentheses. 
Random effects model includes only those elections in the fixed effects sample. ***, ** and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
 
Based on the above fixed effects regression, an incumbent national leader, or a 
successor from the same party, is 5 percent more likely to win re-election for every extra 
percentage point of GDP growth over the preceding electoral term.  
Does world growth affect national elections? Figure 1 charts annual growth in real 
per-capita GDP against the fraction of democratic elections in which the party of the 
incumbent national leader is re-elected (excluding the US and Japan). There appears to be 
a strong relationship between the two, with re-election rates and growth both highest in 
1978, the late-1980s, and 1999. 
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Figure 1: World Growth and National Elections
 
 
From Figure 1, it appears that voters may not be consistently separating the 
effects of the world economy from their national economic performance, as the rational 
voter model predicts. To test this in a more robust fashion, I separate growth into two 
components – world growth (“luck”) and the gap between national growth and world 
growth (“competence”).3 I then estimate the following equation using a probit model: 
 
(3) Re-elect(0,1) c,t = β(Growth World t) + γ(Growth National-World c,t) + ζICountryc + ε c,t
 
As the results in the first column of Table 3 indicate, the effects of luck and 
competence are both significant at the 1 percent level. However, the size of the luck 
coefficient is more than twice as large as the competence coefficient. An extra percentage 
point of world growth over the preceding electoral term raises an incumbent’s chances of 
re-election by 14 percent. However, if that nation’s growth has outpaced world growth by 
one percentage point over the preceding term, this only raises the incumbent’s chances of 
re-election by 4 percent.  
 
                                                 
3 This approach follows Wolfers (2002). 
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Table 3: Which matters more, luck or competence? 
Dependent variable: Whether the party of the national leader is re-elected 
 (1) Assuming world 
growth has the same effect 
on national growth in all 
countries 
(2) Taking account of 
different degrees of 
global integration 
Luck (World growth) 0.140*** 
(0.0451) 
0.0898** 
(0.0380) 
Competence (National 
growth – world growth) 
0.041*** 
(0.0158) 
0.0388** 
(0.0171) 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observed Prob. 0.57 0.57 
Predicted Prob. 0.58 0.58 
Pseudo R2 0.16 0.16 
Elections 268 268 
Countries 58 58 
Notes: Coefficients are marginal probabilities from a probit model, with robust standard errors in 
parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
 
However, in some sense equation (3) is unrealistic, since it assumes that world 
growth affects national growth in all countries equally. In an alternative (preferred) 
specification, I first determine the relationship between world growth and national growth 
for each country, and then to use this to calculate measures of luck and competence for 
each country. This more flexible specification allows for countries to be integrated with 
the world economy to a greater or lesser extent. 
In order to determine the extent to which each country is integrated in the world 
economy, I first estimate the following equation using OLS, for all countries across the 
time span 1975-99. Note that in equation (4), the subscript t refers to a single year 
(whereas in other equations it refers to an election term): 
 
(4) Growth National c,t = α + λGrowthWorld t*ICountryc + ε c,t    
 
From this, the fitted values ( ) can be considered to be luck – since they are the 
amount of national growth in a given year that one would expect, given that year’s world 
growth rate. For a country entirely disengaged from the world economy, E( )=0. The 
residuals (e) are competence – the amount by which a country’s growth rate exceeds or 
lags behind what one would predict, given world growth, and that nation’s degree of 
enmeshment in the global economy.  
λˆ
λˆ
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To determine the relationship between luck and competence, I then take the average of  
and e in each election cycle (call these
λˆ
λˆ and ē), and estimate the following equation: 
 
(5) Re-elect (0,1) c,t = δ + β λˆ c,t + γēc,t + ζICountryc + υ c,t    
 
In a similar manner to equation (3), β in equation (5) is the coefficient on luck, 
and γ is the coefficient on competence. These results are presented in column (2) of Table 
3. In this specification, the coefficients on luck and competence fall slightly, but an extra 
percentage point of world growth over the electoral term still boosts an incumbent’s 
chances of re-election by 9 percent, while outpacing world growth by one percentage 
point only makes the leader 4 percent more likely to be re-elected (both significant at the 
5 percent level). This is the opposite finding to Wolfers (2002), who looks at the effect of 
unemployment, house prices and real income on US gubernatorial elections, and finds 
there is a higher return to competence (∆State-∆National) than luck (∆National). Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, voters in state elections are better at parsing out national effects than 
voters in national elections are at parsing out world effects. 
Might this effect be driven by the price of the world’s most traded commodity, 
oil? To answer this question, I look at the effect of the annualized percentage change in 
the real price of crude oil over the previous election term. This involves estimating the 
following equation: 
 
(6) Re-elect(0,1) c,t = β(∆Real Oil Price t) + ζICountryc + ε c,t  
 
This regression is estimated separately for countries that are net energy importers, 
and those that are net energy exporters. Since a nation’s status as a net importer or a net 
exporter could be endogenous to the oil price, countries are categorized based on data 
from 1971, well in advance of the first election in the sample, and ahead of the oil shocks 
of the 1970s. 
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Table 4: Do changes in the real price of oil affect national elections? 
Dependent variable: Whether the party of the national leader is re-elected 
 (1) Energy importing 
countries 
(2) Energy exporting 
countries 
Average annual increase 
in the real price of oil  
-0.282 
(0.213) 
-0.212 
(0.728) 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observed Prob. 0.57 0.53 
Predicted Prob. 0.58 0.53 
Pseudo R2 0.13 0.15 
Elections 238 30 
Countries 42 6 
Notes: Coefficients are marginal probabilities from a probit model, with robust standard errors in 
parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
Oil price is the average annual change in the IMF oil price over the election cycle. Countries are 
categorized as net energy importers or exporters based on their status in 1971.  
 
As Table 4 indicates, changes in the real oil price do not appear to have any 
statistically significant effect on national elections – either for energy importers or for 
energy exporters.  
 
4. Does Development, Education or the Media Matter? 
Is it possible to explain differing returns to luck and competence by a nation’s 
level of economic development, average educational attainment, or media penetration? If 
the average voter is richer or better educated, it might be that he or she does a better job 
of parsing out the effect of the world economy when deciding whether to re-elect a 
national leader. Some insight into why the media might matter is given in Besley and 
Burgess (2002), who find that Indian state governments provide calamity relief in a more 
timely fashion when newspaper circulation is higher and there is more electoral 
competition.4 In the US context, Gentzkow, Glaeser and Goldin (2004) find that the 
expansion and increasing independence of the media helped reduce corruption. Other 
studies have also shown that across US counties, radio ownership was positively 
correlated with New Deal spending in the 1930s (Strömberg 2004). Across countries, 
press freedom has been shown to be negatively correlated with corruption (Ahrend 2000; 
                                                 
4 Besley and Burgess (2002) theorize that newspaper circulation and political competitiveness should affect 
politicians’ behavior because they increase the incentives for some politicians to signal that they are not of 
the “selfish” type. 
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Brunetti and Weder 2003), and with the political longevity of the national leader (Besley 
and Prat 2004).5
To test these theories, I again estimate equation (5), but this time interacting the 
returns to luck and competence with the level of log per-capita GDP, the mean number of 
years of schooling of the adult population, and three measures of media penetration: the 
number of newspapers, radios and televisions per person. For each country, these figures 
are averaged across the period 1975-2000 (since the model has a country-specific effect, 
it is therefore unnecessary to also include income and education as levels). 
 
Table 5: Do income and education affect the returns to luck and competence? 
Dependent variable: Whether the party of the national leader is re-elected 
 (1) Income (2) Education (3) Income & 
Education 
Luck  0.100 0.0906 0.388 
 (0.214) (0.124) (0.382) 
Competence  -0.231*** -0.0569 -0.152 
 (0.0878) (0.0439) (0.136) 
Luck*GDP 0.000036  -0.0580 
 (0.0256)  (0.0656) 
Competence*GDP 0.0358***  0.0185 
 (0.0113)  (0.0262) 
Luck*Education  0.00404 0.0339 
  (0.0174) (0.0362) 
Competence*Education  0.0199** 0.0110 
  (0.00798) (0.0162) 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observed Prob. 0.57 0.56 0.56 
Predicted Prob. 0.59 0.58 0.58 
Pseudo R2 0.19 0.19 0.20 
Elections 268 232 232 
Countries 58 47 47 
Notes: Coefficients are marginal probabilities from a probit model, with robust standard errors in 
parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. GDP 
is the log of real per capita GDP. Education is the average number of years of education of the population 
aged 15 and over. 
 
Table 5 shows the results from specifications interacting GDP and education. 
Both appear to increase the returns to competence. Recall from the second column of 
Table 3 that a 1 percent increase in national growth (relative to world growth) boosted an 
incumbent’s chances of re-election by 4 percent. For every 10 percent increase in per-
                                                 
5 In some sense, the exercise performed by Besley and Prat (2004) is most closely related to this one, with 
two caveats: their study looks only at political longevity at a single point in time (1997), and covers both 
democracies and non-democracies.  
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capita income, this effect rises by 0.4 percentage points. Likewise, for every 1 year 
increase in schooling, the effect of competence on re-election rises by 0.2 percentage 
points. Both income and education are associated with voters making fewer systematic 
attribution errors. Neither income nor education appears to have a significant impact on 
the “luck” coefficient (the effect of the world economy on national elections). When both 
the GDP and education interactions are included in the model, the coefficients on both 
competence interactions are positive, but insignificant. 
Might the media also affect the returns to luck or competence? To test this 
hypothesis, I include a further set of interactions: the number of newspapers per person, 
radios per person, and televisions per person. In these specifications, I also control for the 
interaction of log real GDP per capita with competence and luck. This ensures that the 
(luck*media) and (competence*media) interactions are picking up the effect of the media 
on luck and competence, holding constant the effect of income on luck and competence. 
Again, since the model has a country-specific effect, it is therefore unnecessary to also 
include each country’s average income and media penetration. 
 
 
Table 6: Does the media affect the returns to luck or competence? 
Dependent variable: Whether the party of the national leader is re-elected 
 (1) Newspapers (2) Radios (3) Televisions 
Luck  -0.166 0.0707 0.306 
 (0.295) (0.247) (0.324) 
Competence  -0.376*** -0.301*** -0.521*** 
 (0.132) (0.112) (0.159) 
Luck*Media -0.757* -0.0524 0.157 
 (0.432) (0.187) (0.405) 
Competence*Media -0.361 -0.0889 -0.550** 
 (0.234) (0.0919) (0.246) 
Luck*GDP 0.0472 0.00732 -0.0260 
 (0.0394) (0.0359) (0.0479) 
Competence*GDP 0.0593*** 0.0496*** 0.0858*** 
 (0.0203) (0.0186) (0.0256) 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observed Prob. 0.57 0.57 0.57 
Predicted Prob. 0.57 0.58 0.58 
Pseudo R2 0.20 0.19 0.20 
Elections 258 268 268 
Countries 58 58 58 
Notes: Coefficients are marginal probabilities from a probit model, with robust standard errors in 
parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. GDP 
is the log of real per capita GDP. “Media” variable differs across columns: number of newspapers (column 
1), radios (column 2) or televisions (column 3) per person. 
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 Table 6 suggests that different types of media have quite different impacts on the 
returns to luck and competence. In countries with a higher newspaper circulation, the 
returns to luck are lower. However, in countries with higher television ownership, the 
returns to competence are lower. Radio ownership does not appear to affect the returns to 
luck or competence. Voters appear to make more systematic attribution errors in 
countries with more televisions, and fewer such errors in countries with more 
newspapers.6
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper has provided evidence that voters commit systematic attribution errors 
when casting their ballots – tending to oust their national leaders when the world 
economy slumps, and retain them when it booms. In the preferred specification, a 1 
percent increase in world GDP growth is associated with an 8 percent increase in the 
probability that an incumbent leader will be re-elected. To put this into perspective, 
national leaders are re-elected, on average, 57 percent of the time. An extra 1 percent of 
world growth raises this probability to 65 percent. In the late-1990s, there were 
approximately 17 democratic elections per year in my sample. Typically, 10/17 of these 
elections would see the incumbent leader returned – but an extra percentage point of 
world GDP growth would see 11/17 leaders returned.  
Across a wide range of countries, voters appear to behave only quasi-rationally. If 
one regards voters as principals and politicians as agents, this finding is akin to Bertrand 
and Mullainathan’s conclusion that CEO compensation tends to be as responsive to a 
“lucky dollar” as to an “earned dollar” (2001). In the case of voting, the problem is likely 
to be exacerbated by the fact that there is only a miniscule chance that any individual 
voter will affect the outcome. If shareholders make systematic attribution errors when the 
stakes are reasonably high, it is hardly surprising that voters do so when there is only an 
infinitesimal chance that their vote will turn out to be pivotal. 
                                                 
6 In the US, Blinder and Krueger (2004) find that television is the most popular source of information about 
economic policy. However, the measured knowledge of economic policy among those who primarily use 
newspapers is 0.4 standard deviations higher than among those who primarily use televisions. For a 
discussion of the factors affecting newspaper and television penetration across countries, see Islam (2002). 
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What factors are associated with voters rewarding competence more and luck 
less? Two factors are income and education. In richer and better educated countries, 
voters are better able to parse out competence from luck in deciding whether to re-elect 
their national leaders. A 10 percent increase in per-capita GDP has approximately the 
same effect as a two-year increase in average educational attainment. Lastly, the media 
matters, though not in a consistent fashion. Having more newspapers reduces the returns 
to luck, while higher rates of television viewing reduce the returns to competence. 
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